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1. INTRODUCTION
Norms have been used to represent, in compact ways, desirable behaviour that au-
tonomous components should have (alternatively, undesirable behaviour they should
not have), so as to provide overall guarantees for distributed, open, and heterogeneous
computing solutions. Research on norms has tackled important issues, ranging from
logic-theoretic aspects (e.g., [Lomuscio and Sergot 2002]) to more pragmatic concerns
(e.g., [Garcı´a-Camino et al. 2005]).
So far, research on normative multi-agent systems has mostly focused on norms
aimed at individuals and has largely ignored a formal treatment of norms aimed at
groups of individuals. The treatment of norms aimed at groups has been limited to
abstractions via the use of roles played by the individual to make norms stable over
extended periods of time. The core fact, however, remains that while addressing mul-
tiple agents singly (namely each agent enacting the role), these norms do not address
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these agents together. When addressing a group of agents, aspects such as responsi-
bility and fulfilment play an important role, aspects that are not seen in typical norm
representations (since the agent addressed is also responsible, and is also the one to
act). In order to grasp the meaning of this difference, we consider for example the obli-
gation for children under the age of 16 to attend school. While the norm addresses
children under the age of 16 who are also the ones who must perform the task of going
to school, the responsibility and blame lie with their parents/guardians. Stating that
“group G should achieve outcome ϕ” does not make clear who in the group should ac-
tually perform the actions that lead to ϕ, and who is to blame if the outcome is not
achieved. Another example is a removal company, which is obliged by contract to move
the contents of someone’s house, including a piano. Given that moving a piano requires
special provisions, even though the removal company is the addressee of the obligation,
the company is not able to act on it itself and must delegate the task.
This concept of group norms, explicitly differentiating between the groups of agents
targeted by the norm, those acting upon it and those responsible for the outcome,
creates a set of coordination issues that is not typically seen in individual norms (or
typical role-addressing norms). For instance, the agents responsible for the norm have
to ensure that they avoid blame, and thus have to ensure that the agents supposed to
act upon it are indeed doing what they are supposed to do. The acting agents might
need to coordinate whether each of them has to do it, if only one of them has to do it,
or if all of them have to do it together (i.e., coordinated group action).
In addition to the coordination issues, group norms present challenges in norm rea-
soning. Reasoning about norms is of central concern to the regulation or control of the
behaviour of a multi-agent system [Boella and van der Torre 2004]. Work on models of
norm-governed practical reasoning agents has so far studied the case of norms geared
to one agent (or role) [Kollingbaum and Norman 2003], that is, the cases in which the
agent is both addressed by and responsible for a norm. In this paper, we present rea-
soning mechanisms for such group norms. These norms require that the agent is both
able to reason about its relation to the norm (i.e., is it addressed, responsible or actor?)
and able to coordinate with other agents affected by the norm to determine how to
handle the norm.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
— We present a taxonomy of group norms, listing and justifying three types of groups
which can be affected by norms, and mapping out a range of possibilities for individ-
ual, representative and collective responsibility and actorship.
— We introduce a formal notation to represent group norms, with its underlying seman-
tics, and use this notation to capture the various cases of our taxonomy.
— We formally relate group norms to a simple organisation model, with a view to sup-
port normative reasoning.
— We put forward mechanisms to enable agents to reason about group norms.
In Section 2 we present a taxonomy of group norms. This taxonomy provides the moti-
vation for our formalisation introduced in Section 3. We illustrate how our formalisa-
tion can be used to represent various situations in Section 4. In Section 5 we present
a minimalist model of agent organisations, capturing the concepts of action, role, and
power; these provide a structured context within which agents can reason with and
about group norms when deciding what to do. In Section 6 we show how agents can
use the organisation model to reason about group norms, namely how to act when they
are addressed by, are responsible for or are the actors of a norm. In Section 7 we model
a cloud computing scenario and illustrate how our approach can help the coordination
of agents. We contrast our research with related work in Section 8 and in Section 9 we
draw conclusions, raise relevant issues, and indicate avenues for future investigation.
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2. A TAXONOMY OF GROUP NORMS
One of the challenges in applying normative theories is that of describing observations
and practices using the formal concepts offered by these theories. Our perception is
that there is a distinct gap between the normative statements used in everyday prac-
tice and those that can be expressed in most (formal) normative modelling frameworks.
In everyday practice, norms can be seen as linguistic statements that prescribe, per-
mit, or oblige actions or outcomes for actors (both individual and collective) [Ostrom
2005]. This definition includes norms of a collective nature, while most formal frame-
works only allow the specification of role-oriented individual norms, that is individual
norms that are specified in a generic way: e.g., “Program Committee members are
obliged to return their reviews before the deadline” or “Project Team members must
file a meeting report within 48 hours after the end of the meeting”. While these norms
are stated more generically than, e.g., “Agent 0x0FF must return its review before the
deadline”, the first example is of a similar individual nature; each agent enacting the
program committee role has to return its review(s) before the deadline. The second
norm is different, however, since of all agents enacting the ‘Project Team member’
role, only one has to file a meeting report for all agents to be compliant with the norm.
In the following we sketch a taxonomy of the different types of group norms, which we
then formalise in Section 3.
Before we start to analyse what differentiates the various types of norms shown as
examples above and in Section 1, let us first discuss the requirements for a formal-
ism to express group norms. A normative formalisation for the expression of collec-
tive/group norms in agent-based organisations should at least include the following
elements:
— Deontic modality – necessary to represent and differentiate obligation, prohibition
and permission (how the norm is influencing behaviours);
— Group representation – necessary to identify those to whom the norm applies (whom
the norm is influencing);
— Action/state representation – necessary to define what behaviour(s) the norm is in-
fluencing (what the norm is influencing).
Moreover, the formalisation should comply with the usual desirable properties of any
formalisation, in that it should be compact, precise, and machine-processable, and that
it should have clear semantics.
Norms provide a way of allocating tasks to groups and individuals, as well as placing
restrictions about tasks on groups and individuals. For example, if one wants that
agent i should achieve outcome ϕ, then one can stipulate that “agent i is obliged to
bring about ϕ”. Likewise, if we want an agent j to refrain from achieving outcome
ϕ, we can state that “agent j is forbidden to achieve ϕ”. In the case of an individual
agent, interpretation is straightforward, but in the case of a group, things get more
complicated.
For instance, by saying that “group G should achieve outcome ϕ”, it is not clear
who in the group should actually perform the actions that lead to ϕ and who should
be blamed if the outcome is not achieved. We explore in this paper a cloud computing
scenario in which group norms govern participants who provide services and managers
who assemble solutions from these services – when a service provider fails to deliver its
functionality, the manager who is trying to achieve an outcome (stipulated by a norm),
by putting together the solution (making use of individual services) may be blamed for
norm violation. Depending on the situation, a norm will address different subjects. In
many cases, it will address those who must act in order to uphold the norm, whereas
in other cases those responsible, but not necessarily acting, are addressed.
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Therefore, besides identifying who is addressed by the norm, two other important
groups that can affect or be affected by a group norm and must be included in the norm
specification, are i) responsibility, and ii) fulfilment, or actorship. We thus distinguish
three types of groups that are affected by a normative statement:
— Addressees describe who are addressed by the normative statement; i.e. to whom
the normative statement applies; often addressees are either actors or responsibles,
but other cases may arise;
— Actors describe who should achieve (or refrain from achieving) the goal or action of
the statement that the norm refers to; and
— Responsibles describe who takes care that the norm is upheld, and can be sanc-
tioned if the norm is violated.
In the example about school attendance above, the children are both the addressee and
the actor, and the parents are the responsible party. In the piano removal example, the
removal company is the addressee and the responsible party, and the subcontractor is
the actor. We notice that the concept of addressee is similar to that of Attribute in the
ADICO grammar for institutions introduced in [Ostrom 2005].
Our approach does not explicitly deal with counterparties of directed norms, estab-
lishing obligations from a bearer (responsible for fulfilling the obligation) to a coun-
terparty (normally, some authority or policing body) [Cardoso and Oliveira 2009]. We
assume that our norms are absolute, that is, they regulate the behaviour of a class
of subjects (addressees), instead of regulating the relations between groups. This as-
sumption is realistic as we provide a description of the normative system from the
perspective of the counterparty. In our approach, a commitment between addressee
and counterparty [Torroni et al. 2009] is a complex inter-relation among addressees,
actors and responsibles. In our research the addressee represents the subject of the
norm from the perspective of the external world, or counterparty. Given that in some
cases, the subject of a norm is its actors and, in other cases, its responsibles, the explicit
use of an addressee makes it easier to represent these two situations.
In our view, responsibility expresses who gets the blame when the norm is violated
(i.e., when obligations are not acted upon, or when forbidden actions are performed).
This aspect of norms was already investigated in [Grossi et al. 2004], with respect to
(collective) obligations. It is also similar to the notion of “backward looking” responsi-
bility, as defined in [de Lima et al. 2010]. A limitation in the approaches of [de Lima
et al. 2010] and [Grossi et al. 2004] is that they only consider obligations and collec-
tive action. Moreover, responsibility can be viewed on several levels with respect to
collective norms: a) each individual addressed by the norm is responsible for its part
in the norm (individual responsibility), b) the group as a whole is held accountable for
failing to comply with a norm (collective responsibility), or c) a representative of the
group is responsible for the failures of the group (representative responsibility); that is,
a previously appointed member is held accountable for failures of the group to comply
with the norm.
Next to responsibility, we differentiate norms in terms of fulfilment or actorship, that
is, looking at who should fulfil the norm. This is similar to the notion of “forward look-
ing” responsibility, which according to [de Lima et al. 2010] accounts for task allocation
and achievement. In some cases, each group member has to do his/her part in fulfill-
ing the norm (that is, individual actorship). In other cases, it might be required that
the group performs a collective action together (that is, collective actorship). While, in
most formalisms, these are considered the same (as collective actions are assumed to
be decomposable into individual parts), they have a distinct coordination difference.
In the latter all the individual parts (namely, the single agent contributes with parts
of the collective action) have to be performed in synchrony to be successful, while in
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Table I. Taxonomy of group norms, based on responsibility and fulfilment.
Individual
Responsibility
Representative
Responsibility
Collective
Responsibility
Individual
Actorship
(1,1) Individual norm
specified in a generic
(role-based) way: “PC
members are obliged
to return their reviews
before the deadline.”
(1,2) Individual action,
appointed blame: “Em-
ployees are obliged to do
task, but if task goes
wrong blame manage-
ment.”
(1,3) Individual action,
collective blame: “Every
child must clean his/her
worktable, otherwise the
whole class will miss
morning break.”
Representative
Actorship
(2,1) Appointed ac-
tion, individual blame:
“Group leader must
submit report by 12pm,
otherwise each student
in the group fails the
course.”
(2,2) Appointed action,
appointed blame: “Ev-
ery meeting ought to
have public minutes.
The chairman is re-
sponsible for correct
minutes being taken by
secretary.”
(2,3) Appointed action,
collective blame: “The
child who broke the
flowerpot must confess,
otherwise the whole
class will miss morning
break.”
Collective
Actorship
(3,1) Collective ac-
tion, individual blame:
“Groups of more than
3 children are not al-
lowed to enter the shop
together.”
(3,2) Collective action,
appointed blame: “All
PhD students must pack
the supervisor’s stuff for
the departmental move,
otherwise the supervisor
will be blamed.”
(3,3) Group action,
group blame: “All chil-
dren must clean the
classroom together,
otherwise the whole
class will miss morning
break.”
the former, each agent can decide on its own when to perform the required individual
action; one should compare, for instance, lifting a table (which is necessarily done to-
gether) with submitting a review (which has less stringent coordination restrictions1).
There is a third case, where it might be that a single group member (or a select subset
of the group) fulfilling the norm is sufficient, e.g., as in the filing of a meeting report
example mentioned above; we call this latter type representative actorship.
This analysis of norms along these two directions, namely, responsibility and fulfil-
ment, can be summarised by the matrix of options shown in Table I, with an example
illustrating each case. Note that these examples are meant purely as informal illus-
trative of the intuitions behind the concept of group norms.
In can be noted that Table I does not explicitly refer to the addressee of each norm.
In fact, and as discussed above, in most cases the addressee is either the actor or the
responsible group. We introduce the concept of addressee to be able to deal with this
difference in a uniform way. An example of a norm where the addressee is the actor
is listed in cell (1,1). Cell (2,1) gives an example of a norm where the addressee is the
responsible group.
3. GROUP NORMS
Norms provide a compact way of constraining behaviours of groups and individuals.
For example, if one wants agent i to achieve outcome ϕ, then one can stipulate that
“agent i is obliged to achieve ϕ”, this being formalised as a deontic formula Oiϕ. In
the case of an individual agent, interpretation is straightforward, but in the case of a
group, many issues arise. By simply stating “group G should achieve ϕ”, it is not made
explicit who is to act (that is, whether each group member individually, if only one
1The only coordination aspect of submitting paper reviews is that they are all performed before a particular
deadline, instead of their being done simultaneously.
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group member, or if all of them together), and who is to blame when violations occur.
We can take again the example from the introduction: the obligation for children under
the age of 16 to attend school. While the norm addresses children under the age of 16,
who are also the ones that must act upon it, the responsibility and blame lie with the
parents.
It is with the aim to capture the various stakeholders involved in group norms that
we put forward our formalisation below. In the rest of this section we first introduce
a language of set definitions required to precisely establish the various groups of our
norms. After that we introduce group norms and provide their semantics via temporal
logic.
3.1. Set Definitions
We propose to represent groups as set definitions and operations. We assume the exis-
tence of a non-empty and finite universal set Agents = {ag1, . . . , agn} consisting of the
unique identifier of each agent in our society.
Definition 3.1 (Set Definition). A set definition Σ is determined by the following
grammar
Σ ::= Σ ∪ Σ | Σ ∩ Σ | Σ \ Σ | ΣC | S
S ::= {ag1, . . . , agm} | {α : P (α)}
The grammar establishes a language LΣ of set definitions and it captures some of the
common operations of naı¨ve set theory [Halmos 1960], namely, union, intersection,
difference, and absolute complement (with respect to the universal set Agents). The
S stands for an actual set, and it can be represented as an extensive (finite) listing
{ag1, . . . , agm} ⊆ Agents of the elements of the set, or an intensional definition {α :
P (α)}, standing for ∀α ∈ Agents.P (α), that is, all those elements of the universal set
that fulfil some property P .
We extend the language of set definitions LΣ to represent more sophisticated sce-
narios. It is common for certain norms to address groups with size restrictions, as in
“gatherings of more than 5 people are prohibited”. We can formalise such requirements
as |Σ| ◦ n, where ◦ is a comparison operator >,<,≥,≤,=, or 6= and n ∈ N (a natural
number). These set definitions can be seen as constrained sets and they place restric-
tions on which sets can be built. For instance, if Agents = {a, b, c, d} the definition
|{α : >}| = 3 (where > stands for “true”, that is a property which is vacuously true
for everyone) stands for all subsets of Agents with 3 elements, that is, all groups of 3
agents.
A set definition gives rise to different actual values of groups, depending on the uni-
versal set of agents. Rather than requiring that groups have their individuals listed
one by one, our set definitions are more compact and can be re-used for different spe-
cific populations of agents. We formally define the value of a set definition Σ with
respect to the universal set Agents, denoted as value(Σ,Agents) ⊆ Agents, as follows:
Definition 3.2 (Set Definition Value).
1. value(Σ′ ∪ Σ′′,Agents) = value(Σ′,Agents) ∪ value(Σ′′,Agents)
2. value(Σ′ ∩ Σ′′,Agents) = value(Σ′,Agents) ∩ value(Σ′′,Agents)
3. value(Σ′ \ Σ′′,Agents) = value(Σ′,Agents) \ value(Σ′′,Agents)
4. value(ΣC ,Agents) = Agents \ value(Σ,Agents)
5. value({ag1, . . . , agm},Agents) = {ag1, . . . , agm}
6. value({α : P (α)},Agents) = {ag0, . . . , agm},∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m, ag i ∈ Agents ∧ P (ag i)
7. value(|Σ| ◦ n,Agents) = value(Σ,Agents) s.t . |value(Σ,Agents)| ◦ n
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Group Norms for Multi-Agent Organisations A:7
Cases 1–4 decompose a set definition into its sub-parts, recursively obtaining their
values, which then are combined, using the corresponding set operations – this is a
straightforward mapping of our notation to the usual semantics of sets. Cases 5 and 6
are the base cases: a set tabulation is itself, and an intensional definition gives rise to
every possible sub-set whose elements satisfy property P . Case 7 generically defines
the meaning of constrained sets – these are the values of the set definition which
satisfy their constraints.
We assume a reference set Agents in our discussion, and since we are chiefly inter-
ested in what the set definitions actually are, we will simply use the set definitions Σ,
meaning value(Σ,Agents).
3.2. Group Norms and their Semantics
We formally capture three different groups as set expressions Σ, as introduced in the
previous sub-section, as well as the usual components of norms, namely, the deontic
modality and the target of the norm [Garcı´a-Camino et al. 2005; Lomuscio and Sergot
2002].
We use a set of propositions P, with which one can construct formulae using the
usual operators ¬,∧,∨,→,↔. We represent generic atomic propositions as p, q, r and
we use ϕ, δ, ψ to indicate propositional formulas. The set of well-formed propositional
formulas is denoted as LP . We define group norms as follows:
Definition 3.3 (Group norms). Group norms are of the form AORG ϕ < δ (a group
obligation) or AFRG ϕ < δ (a group prohibition), where A,R and G are set definitions
(from the language LΣ of Def. 3.1), and ϕ, δ are propositional formulae from LP . We
refer to group norms in general as ADRG ϕ < δ (where D is either O or F).
Intuitively, the annotations A, R and G of the deontic modalities O and F correspond
to respectively the actors (those agents whose behaviours are affected by the norm),
those responsible for the norm and the addressees of the norm. The construct ϕ < δ
informally states “ϕ before δ”, a temporal constraint which enables us to capture dead-
lines of obligations and periods of prohibitions. It should be noted that we represent
achievement obligations, not maintenance obligations. In future work, we will look at
the formalisation of group maintenance norms.
The propositions of formula ϕ may represent actions or properties of states of af-
fairs. In the case of actions, a norm such as AORG paint door < δ would place an
obligation on groups A,G,R to carry out action paint door . More flexibility and expres-
siveness can be achieved though if ϕ represents properties of states; an example norm
is AORG painted door < δ which stipulates an obligation on groups A,G,R to carry
out whatever is required in order to achieve a state in which painted door holds – that
is, they should “see to it that” the door is painted, either by painting it themselves or
finding someone to paint it on their behalf [Horty 2001]. We do not commit ourselves
to either of these options – both can be expressed with our formalism, assuming a
suitable semantics for actions and a representation of states is available.
We provide the semantics of our group norms via a temporal logic based on CTL*
[Emerson 1990]. Our temporal logical language LT P extends our propositional logic LP
by adding path operators A (all paths), E (some paths), and state operators © (next),
2 (always), 3 (sometime), and U (until). The language is further enriched with stit ,
stit(α,ϕ) meaning agent α “sees to it that” ϕ [Belnap and Perloff 1988] and expressing
individual action, and stit(G,ϕ) meaning that group G together “sees to it that” ϕ, for
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collective action2. The semantics of this logic is constructed in the typical manner from
the semantics of CTL* [Emerson 1990] combined with stit [Belnap and Perloff 1988].
In our semantics the deontic modalities are handled via an Anderson’s reduction [An-
derson 1958] of the modality to the reserved viol(G,A,R, ϕ) construct indicating that
a violation has happened of G’s norm on ϕ by (in)action of A under the responsibility
of R. We define the meaning of group obligations as follows:
Definition 3.4 (Semantics of Obligation).
AORG ϕ < δ
def
= A
3δ ∧ ( ¬δ ∧ ¬stit(A,ϕ)∧¬viol(G,A,R, ϕ)
)
U
 ( ¬δ ∧ stit(A,ϕ)∧©(A2 ¬viol(G,A,R, ϕ))
)
∨
(δ ∧ viol(G,A,R, ϕ))

Intuitively, this definition expresses that the deadline δ will occur at some point in
time and for all paths either ϕ is achieved by the actors (stit(A,ϕ)), in which case no
violation of the obligation will ever occur (©(A2 ¬viol(G,A,R, ϕ))), or the state is not
achieved, the deadline occurs, and a violation happens (δ ∧ viol(G,A,R, ϕ)). Similarly,
we define the meaning of group prohibitions:
Definition 3.5 (Semantics of Prohibition).
AFRG ϕ < δ
def
= A
( ¬δ ∧ ¬stit(A,ϕ)∧¬viol(G,A,R, ϕ)
)
U
 ( ¬δ ∧ stit(A,ϕ)∧viol(G,A,R, ϕ)
)
∨
(δ ∧ A2¬viol(G,A,R, ϕ))

Group prohibitions are similar to group obligations, except that the deadline δ is bet-
ter seen as a deactivation of the prohibition (and may therefore not actually occur in
the future states, meaning that the prohibition is not deactivated). So, no violation
happens until either a violation is triggered by seeing to it that the prohibited state is
achieved before the deactivation (¬δ ∧ stit(A,ϕ) ∧ viol(G,A,R, ϕ)) or the prohibition is
deactivated (after which no violation can occur (δ ∧ A2¬viol(G,A,R, ϕ)).
With these definitions of the meaning of group norms, a norm on individual action
when G = A = R, all refering to a role specification in an organisation, expresses
the same as in, for example, [Broersen et al. 2004; Dignum 2004] – all those agents
adopting a role (hence belonging to the group) are simultaneously actors, addressees,
and responsible parties. For simplification and without loss of generality, in the rest of
our discussion we may drop the deadline component of our norms.
To relate the groups and individuals of a norm, we formalise in Section 5 a notion
of power (Def. 5.4) – we address social power (viz., a relation among individuals of
a society, establishing who has authority or control over others [Friedkin 1986]), as
opposed to institutional power (viz., whereby members of an institution are empowered
to perform certain deeds [Demolombe and Louis 2006; Jones and Sergot 1996]). We
represent power as a relation x 4 y establishing that agent x is under the power of
agent y (or conversely, that y has power over x). This relation also applies to groups of
agents, as presented later on in the paper.
4. REPRESENTING GROUP NORMS
Using the formal definitions introduced in section 3, we present here the formal speci-
fication of the different types of group norms described in Section 2. Depending on the
membership of the different groups (addressees, actors, and responsible) the scope of
influence of the group norm is different.
2We explain in Section 5.2 how we differentiate collective and individual actions.
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Table II. Formal characterisation of the different types of group norms .
Individual
Responsibility
Representative
Responsibility
Collective
Responsibility
Individual
Actorship ∀x ∈ G :
{x}D{x}G ϕ
A 4 R,
∀x ∈ G : {x}DRG ϕ
R = G,
∀x ∈ G : {x}DRG ϕ
Representative
Actorship
A 4 G,
∀x ∈ G : AD{x}G ϕ
A 4 G,A 4 R :
ADRG ϕ
A 4 G,R = G :
ADRG ϕ
Collective
Actorship
A = G,
∀x ∈ G : AD{x}G ϕ
A = G,A 4 R :
ADRG ϕ
A = R = G :
ADRG ϕ
Table II provides the formalisation of the different types of group norms described in
section 2, as follows. Concerning responsibility, individual responsibility is defined as
assigning responsibility to each member of the Addressee set, i.e. norm responsibility
is distributed to each of the Addressees, i.e. ADRG ϕ is equivalent to
∧
x∈G
AD{x}{x} ϕ. In
collective responsibility, the Responsible set R is the same as the Addressee set, R = G.
Representative responsibility is more complex. As seen in some of the examples above,
in some cases those who are responsible for upholding a norm (and getting the blame if
not) are not those addressed by the norm (e.g. parents are responsible for the obligation
for children to attend school). However, in order to be able to enforce responsibility, a
power relation must exist between the Responsible group R and the Actor group A,
represented as A 4 R (read as “A is under the power of R”; a formal definition of power
among roles, and hence groups, is put forward in Section 5).
Actorship is dealt with in a similar way. In the individual case, each member of the
Addressee set is the Actor of the norm, i.e. ADRG ϕ is equivalent to
∧
x∈G
{x}DR{x} ϕ.
In the collective case, all Addressees must act together on the norm, A = R = G.
Again, in the Representative Actorship case, a power relation is required between the
Addressees and the Actors, A 4 G.
The different interpretations of group norms above also reflect on the target of the
norm, i.e. the action being influenced by the norm. In all types of actorship, we assume
that the members of the Actor set have the capabilities to act on the target. We are
aware that this is a very strong assumption and that the matter of linking capabilities
to action is an open research issue which is out of the scope of this paper (we refer the
interested reader to, e.g., [Dignum and Dignum 2011]). We interpret the target of the
different types of group norms as follows:
— Individual Actorship – the target ϕ is an individual action, i.e. ∀x ∈ A : stit(x, ϕ)
— Collective Actorship – the target ϕ is a collective action of the whole Addressee
group, i.e. stit(G,ϕ)
— Representative Actorship – the target ϕ can be either an individual or a collec-
tive action. That is, if the actor set is singleton, i.e., A = {ag}, then ϕ is such that
stit(ag , ϕ); if the actor set is composed of more than one agent, i.e. |A| > 1, then ϕ is
such that stit(A,ϕ)
In the following, we briefly demonstrate the applicability of the formalism by providing
the formal representation of the examples described in Table I:
— Case (1,1) Individual Responsibility, Individual Actorship – PC members are obliged
to return their reviews before the deadline:
∀x ∈ PCMembers : {x}O{x}PCMembers return review < deadline
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— Case (1,2) Representative Responsibility, Individual Actorship – Employees are
obliged to do task, but if task goes wrong blame management:
∀x ∈ Employees, x 4 Management : {x}OManagementEmployees task
— Case (1,3) Collective Responsibility, Individual Actorship – Every student must clean
his/her worktable, otherwise the whole class will miss the morning break:
∀x ∈ Class : {x}OClassClass clean worktable
— Case (2,1) Individual Responsibility, Representative Actorship – Group leader must
submit report by 12pm, otherwise each student in the group fails the course:
∀x ∈ Students,∃leader ∈ Students, leader 4 Students : {leader}O{x}Students submit < 12pm
— Case (2,2) Representative Responsibility, Representative Actorship – Every meeting
ought to have public minutes. The chairman is responsible for correct minutes being
taken by secretary:
∃secr ∈ Meeting ,∃chair ∈ Meeting , secr 4 chair : {secr}O{chair}Meeting take minutes
— Case (2,3) Collective Responsibility, Representative Actorship – The student who
broke the flowerpot must confess, otherwise the whole class will miss the morning
break:
∃guiltyChild ∈ Class, guiltyChild 4 Class : {guiltyChild}OClassClass confess break
— Case (3,1) Individual Responsibility, Collective Actorship – Groups of more than 3
children are not allowed to enter the shop together:
∀x ∈ Children : |{x}∪{y∈Children:>}|>3F{x}Children enter shop
— Case (3,2) Representative Responsibility, Collective Actorship – All PhD students
must pack the supervisor’s stuff for the departmental move, otherwise, the supervisor
will be blamed:
PhDStudents 4 supervisor : PhDStudentsO{supervisor}PhDStudents pack stuff
— Case (3,3) Collective Responsibility, Collective Actorship – All children must clean
the classroom together, otherwise the whole class will miss the morning break:
ClassOClassClass clean classroom
Exceptional cases where both those acting (A) as well as those responsible (R) differ
from those targeted (G), in the most extreme case with no overlap between the actors
and the addressees (G ∩ A = ∅) and no overlap between those responsible and the
addressees (G ∩ R = ∅), can only happen for group norms with representative actor-
ship and representative responsibility. An example of such a norm is handled in the
illustrative scenario given in Section 7.
5. A MINIMALIST ORGANISATION MODEL
There are many approaches to modelling organisations (e.g., [Dignum 2004; Hannoun
et al. 2000; McCallum et al. 2008]), but they possess many features in common. Our
organisation model aims at capturing only those aspects necessary to explore the phe-
nomena and mechanisms related to group norms and joint behaviour/coordination. We
make use of the agent’s identity (i.e., the set Agents), and we formalise the following
aspects:
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Group Norms for Multi-Agent Organisations A:11
— Roles – these are useful abstractions for (groups of) individuals, conferring general-
ity on organisation specifications. The organisation remains the same, even though
different individuals comprise it.
— Capabilities – we associate roles with sets of capabilities, represented as actions.
These can be understood in two ways: i) individuals taking up a role should be able
to perform what that role entails; ii) they specify what individuals are expected to do
in the normal running of the organisation.
— Power – within organisations it is necessary to relate roles to one another, so as to
facilitate coordination and load-sharing, ultimately enabling objectives (see below) to
be achieved. In our proposal, roles exert power (or influence) over other roles, giving
rise to power structures such as lines of command, managed teams, hierarchies, and
egalitarian teams.
We make use of our propositional language LP ; a set of propositional formulae
{ϕ1, ϕ2, . . .} represents the conjunction ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ · · · . We use two special propositions
> and ⊥ to represent, respectively, “true” and “false”. We assume that the meaning of
propositions are captured with formulae establishing logical relations in a knowledge
base (or, to use a more modern terminology, a reference ontology) shared by all stake-
holders and components3 (e.g., engineers, designers, tools, software agents, and so on).
We relate our formulae via logical entailment (formally, “|=”) and deduction (formally,
“`”): for any formulae ϕ,ψ, if ϕ |= ψ then ϕ ` ψ (completeness) and if ϕ ` ψ then ϕ |= ψ
(correctness).
In particular, in our work we make use of logical implications represented as (p1 ∧
· · · ∧ pn) → q to forge relationships among propositions, thus providing a background
theory (or axioms). We denote as Ω, a set of formulae from LP , our background theory
and we define the meaning of logical implication in terms of entailment as:
if ((p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn)→ q) ∈ Ω and Ω |= pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then Ω |= q
A similar relation is defined for the “`” operator, if we assume its completeness.
We represent a repertoire of actions available during the enactment of an organisa-
tion. We propose an idealised representation for actions, and consider these as being
i) instantaneous (i.e. they take one unit of time to be performed, that is, they do not
have a duration or a period for their execution to be completed), ii) they are either
executed or not (i.e., we do not capture situations whereby actions are partially per-
formed nor do we address scenarios in which actions are performed with degrees of
success/quality). We make use of the set P of propositions as well as a set of negated
propositions P− = {¬p | p ∈ P}4.
Definition 5.1 (Action). An action ac is the triple 〈S, ac, S′〉 where S ⊆ P ∪ P−,
S′ ⊆ P, and ac is an action label.
The action labels uniquely identify actions. Our actions model pre-conditions S (a set
of possibly negated propositions) which should be satisfied for action ac to be per-
formed, and the result of performing this action (ac’s post-conditions) is S′, a set of
non-negated propositions. We assume a universal, non-empty and finite set of actions
3More realistically, the stakeholders and components have means to relate their knowledge bases (or, to
re-phrase this in more modern terms, “align their ontologies”), thus being able to map their knowledge
representation on to that of other parties.
4It is important to notice that the pre-conditions of an action may contain negated propositions, but not the
post-conditions. We present in Section 5.1 an operational semantics showing how agents performing actions
update a global state of computation.
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Ac = {ac1, . . . ,acn}, such that no two actions have the same label:
∀aci ∈ Ac,∀acj ∈ Ac.
 aci = 〈Si, aci, S′i〉 ∧acj = 〈Sj , acj , S′j〉 ∧
aci = acj
↔ (Si = Sj ∧ S′i = S′j)
 (1)
The formula above states that within our set of actions, any two elements with the
same labels must have the same pre- and post-conditions, i.e., they must be the same.
Since actions have unique labels, we shall use ac and ac interchangeably.
Importantly, we model the norms of our scenario in Section 7 addressing properties
of states, rather than actions. This is without loss of generality since for any action
〈S, ac, S′〉, where S′ = {p′1, . . . , p′n}, we have
ADRG ac ↔ ADRG (p′1 ∧ · · · ∧ p′n)
that is, a norm on an action is equivalent to a norm on its post-conditions. In the case
when S′ = ∅, we have
ADRG ac ↔ ADRG >
That is, a norm on an action without any effect is equivalent to a norm on the vacuously
true proposition “>”, as the empty set is a sub-set of any set, ∅ ⊆ S.
We represent roles as labels available to individual agents when they join the or-
ganisation during the enactment. We associate with each role a possibly empty set of
action labels, depicting what the role requires to be done:
Definition 5.2 (Role). A role rl is the pair 〈rl ,Ac′〉 where rl is the role label and
Ac′ ⊆ Ac is a set of action labels (cf. Def. 5.1).
When an agent joins an organisation it takes up one or more roles; by taking up a role
the agent agrees to perform any of the actions associated with that role, whenever it is
required (or whenever the agent is asked to). We assume a universal, non-empty and
finite set of roles Rl = {rl1, . . . , rlm}, such that no two roles have the same label:
∀rli ∈ Rl ,∀rlj ∈ Rl .
[(
rli = 〈rl i,Aci〉 ∧
rlj = 〈rl j ,Acj〉 ∧
rl i = rl j
)
↔ (Aci = Acj)
]
That is, any two elements of the set of roles with the same label must have the same
sets of actions, thus making these indistinguishable. Because roles have unique names,
we shall use rl and rl interchangeably. There are more sophisticated and expressive
ways to represent roles, allowing one to define constraints on how many agents can
take up the role, the least/highest number of agents for each role, relations among
roles (e.g., who takes up roles rl1, rl2 should not take up rl3), and so on, as reported in,
for instance, [Dignum 2004; Hannoun et al. 2000; McCallum et al. 2008], but as we
aim at a minimalist model, we do not include these here.
When individual agents join organisations they take up roles which they will enact
during the life-time of the organisation. We thus consider agents associated with a set
of roles, 〈α,Rl ′〉, α ∈ Agents,Rl ′ ⊆ Rl . We define an agent’s capabilities – the properties
of the states that the agent can bring about based on the roles the agent has adopted
and the actions associated with these roles:
Definition 5.3 (Capabilities). We define the set of α’s capabilities (when enacting
roles Rl ′), denoted as cap(α,Rl ′), as:
cap(α,Rl ′) =
⋃
〈S,ac,S′〉∈AllAc
S′ where AllAc =
⋃
〈rl,Ac〉∈Rl′
Ac
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That is, the capability of an agent α undertaking roles Rl is the union of the post-
conditions S′ of all actions AllAc of all of α’s roles.
Next, we formally relate roles via power, as explored in, for instance, [Jones and
Sergot 1996; Lo´pez y Lo´pez 2003; Oren et al. 2010], and more recently (and closer to
our approach) in [Dignum and Dignum 2011]:
Definition 5.4 (Power). Power 4⊆ 2Rl is a reflexive and transitive relation over the
set Rl of roles. If rl1 4 rl2 we say that rl2 has power over rl1 or alternatively that rl1 is
under the power of rl2.
When an agent enacts a role rl2 which “has power over” another role rl1 then that
agent may request the help of any agent enacting rl1 to achieve a particular state of
affairs. This request for help is, within a formal organisation, equivalent to delegation,
since power relations should be followed without question. Power and delegation is
best understood via the “see to it” (stit) operator [Horty 2001], stit(rl, ϕ) standing for
“role rl sees to it that ϕ”.
If stit(rl, ϕ) and rl = 〈rl ,Ac′〉 hold, then one of the following properties must also
hold:
(1) Role rl has associated actions with combined post-conditions logically entailing ϕ.
Formally:
S∗ =
 ⋃
〈S,ac,S′〉∈Ac′
S′
 and S∗ |= ϕ
(2) Role rl has power over roles rl′i each of which can see to it that ϕ′i, and these
combined ϕ′i logically entail ϕ. Formally,
Φ′ = {ϕ′i : rl′i 4 rl ∧ stit(rl′i, ϕ′i)} and Φ′ |= ϕ
Since the power relation is reflexive, that is, all roles have power over themselves (∀rl ∈
Rl .rl 4 rl), then property 2 above also addresses scenarios in which agents delegate
responsibility over the achievement of some ϕ′i but they also retain responsibility for
achieving some ϕ′i, through their own actions.
The power relation can be extended to relate individual agents: let there be two
agents ag1, ag2 with associated sets of roles 〈ag1,Rl1〉, 〈ag2,Rl2〉; if there is a role rl′′ ∈
Rl2 for which there is a role rl′ ∈ Rl1 such that rl′ 4 rl′′, then we say ag1 4 ag2. That
is, ag2 has power over ag1 if at least one of ag2’s roles has power over one of ag1’s roles.
We notice that this is a “weak” definition of power which could, in some situations, lead
to loops in delegation – this is an undesirable feature of an organisation specification
to which designers should be alerted5. A stronger definition would require that, in
addition to the requirements above, we also had rl′′ 64 rl′, for all roles rl′, rl′′.
We further extend the power relation to account for groups (sets) of agents, as fol-
lows:
Definition 5.5. Given sets Agents1,Agents2 ⊆ Agents, and a power relation 4 ⊆
2Agents we say that Agents2 has power over Agents1, denoted as Agents1 4 Agents2, if,
5During the enactment of an organisation (run-time) each agent adopts a sub-set of roles. If the power rela-
tion has any loop then there is potential for loops when agents (acting in different roles) are delegating. By
detecting/flagging loops in the power relation at design time we are warning designers about such potential
loops in delegation at run-time. More sophisticated representations for roles [Dignum and Dignum 2011;
Carmo and Pacheco 2001; Pacheco and Carmo 2003] addressing features such as “at most one agent should
be in this role” (cardinality of a role) and “whomever takes up this role cannot take up this other role” (com-
patibility of roles), could avoid certain combinations of roles, thus partitioning the graph of roles (vertices)
and power relations (edges) into sub-graphs without loops.
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and only if
∀α′ ∈ Agents1,∃α′′ ∈ Agents2 : α′ 4 α′′
That is, every member of Agents1 is under the power of at least one member of Agents2.
In order to model realistic scenarios, group norms ADRG ϕ (where D is either O or
F) should fulfil the following properties:
(1) A 4 R – the group of actors A must be under the power of the responsible group
R. This property ensures that those responsible for the norm should be able to
delegate to actors.
(2) A 4 G – the group of actors A must be under the power of the group G addressed
by the norm. This property ensures that addressees are also able to delegate to
actors.
Both properties above can be checked at run-time, when the groups are instantiated
with specific members. Concerning the power relation between Addressees and Re-
sponsibles, in most realistic models, it will be the case that G ∩ (A ∪ R) 6= ∅, and
G ∩ A 6= ∅ ∨ G ∩ R 6= ∅, i.e. the Addressee group overlaps in some extent with the
Actors or Responsibles group. We consider the specification of these relations for a
given application domain to be design decisions, and therefore do not impose G 4 R
nor R 4 G. (E.g., a norm aimed at a group of junior engineers G has a senior man-
ager responsible R for it, and operators as actors A) R and G do not directly relate
power-wise.
5.1. A Computational Model for Norm-Aware Multi-Agent Organisations
We outline a computational model for norm-aware multi-agent organisations, provid-
ing a context for Defs. 5.1–5.5. Our model is built around an explicit representation
of the global state S∗ ⊆ P of the computation in which pre-conditions of actions are
checked for and their post-conditions (effects) are recorded: given a state Si and an ac-
tion 〈S, ac, S′〉, if S holds in Si (see below) then the action can be applied and we obtain
a next state6 Si+1 = S′.
We follow the architecture for distributed norm management proposed in [Garcı´a-
Camino et al. 2008; Vasconcelos et al. 2012], and consider a global state which is up-
dated as a result of individual agent’s actions – this is similar to transition systems
[Emerson 1990]. We represent this as the construct S0 ⇒ S1 ⇒ · · · , showing a
sequence of global states 〈S0, S1, . . .〉 created from an initial state S0 with the “⇒” op-
eration indicating the application of a set of actions (from possibly many individual
agents) on Si, giving rise to Si+1.
Negated propositions in pre-conditions of actions (cf. Def. 5.1) are interpreted as
negation as failure [Clark 1978], that is, they hold if they cannot be proven true. Since
we are dealing with single propositions (rather than formulae), to check if a negated
proposition ¬p holds in a state S we need to check that p does not appear in S, that is,
S |= ¬p if, and only if, p 6∈ S. Given a set S′ ⊆ P ∪P− of (possibly negated) propositions,
we establish when S |= S′:
S |= S′ if, and only if,
{ ∀(¬p) ∈ S′, p 6∈ S
∀p ∈ S′, p ∈ S
6This means that propositions are not implicitly recorded in (copied onto) the next state; a proposition will
only be copied from one state onto the next state if it appears both in the pre- and post-conditions of an
action.
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Given a set of actions Ac and a global state S∗, individual agents can compute the
subset of actions Ac′ ⊆ Ac whose pre-conditions hold in S∗:
applicableActions(Ac, S∗) = {〈S, ac, S′〉 ∈ Ac | S∗ |= S}
An underlying infrastructure controls access to global states, and mediates how and
when an update is to take place. Agents decide on the actions they want to perform
(chosen from applicableActions), and update the global state directly. Since the post-
conditions of actions do not contain negated propositions (cf. Def. 5.1) the resulting
state will not have inconsistencies7. Agents join an organisation and take up roles, each
of which with its own associated actions (cf. Def 5.2). Given a role rl ∈ Rl , rl = 〈rl ,Ac′〉,
then the agent can compute applicableActions(Ac′, S∗).
We provide means to check which group norms hold, using their deadlines/periods δ.
For simplicity our norms do not have activation conditions, and this is interpreted as
a norm being active until δ holds in S∗, that is,
active(
ADRG ϕ < δ, S
∗) holds if, and only if, S∗ 6|= δ
Agents are able to find out all those active group norms, and use the group norm
reasoning mechanism (Alg. 1) defined in Section 6 to establish how to handle the group
norm – as a member of a group of actors, addressees or responsibles.
5.2. Individual and Collective Actions
Our formalisation in Def. 5.1 caters for both individual and collective actions. We dif-
ferentiate between these in a pragmatic fashion: collective actions are those whose
post-conditions (effects) are achievable via the combination of other (individual or col-
lective) actions. Formally, given a set of actions Ac, ac ∈ Ac,ac = 〈S, ac, S′〉 is a collec-
tive action if, and only if, the conditions below hold
(1) for some n ≥ 2, there are aci ∈ Ac,aci 6= ac,aci = 〈Si, aci, S′i〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, that is,
there are (at least two) other actions ac1, . . . ,acn,
(2) S |= ⋃ni=1 Si, whose pre-conditions are entailed by S
(3) (
⋃n
i=1 S
′
i) |= S′, whose post-conditions entail S′
(4) Given a set AssocRl of pairs 〈α,Rl ′〉, α ∈ Agents,Rl ′ ⊆ Rl , establishing the roles
Rl ′ which individual agents α are enacting, then S′ 6⊆ cap(α,Rl ′) for all 〈α,Rl ′〉 ∈
AssocRl .
The first condition establishes the “break-down” of a collective action into other ac-
tions8. The second condition ensures that actions aci are applicable whenever ac is
applicable. The third condition ensures that the combined effect (post-conditions) of
actions aci addresses all post-conditions of ac. The fourth condition states that for
a particular organisation enactment (that is, agents associated with specific roles), a
collective action is not within the capabilities of any one individual agent α however
many roles Rl ′ it has adopted.
7There could be situations in which, although there are no occurrences of p and ¬p, the domain modelled
could establish that propositions lightOn and lightOff are contradictory. In such circumstances, a more
sophisticated global process would ensure that actions are handled in some order (say, starting with the
agents with highest power) and any action which could introduce a contradiction would be rejected.
8Collective actions have large sets of post-conditions reflecting the “effort” to be spent in order to achieve
them. By breaking apart an action into other (simpler) actions which together achieve the same effects (post-
conditions) we capture the delegation process supported by the power relation, and which is explored in our
reasoning mechanisms.
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The assumption made in connection to Def. 5.1, represented as Formula 1, also im-
plies9 that no two different actions have the same pre- and post-conditions. This means
that our set of actions gives rise to a tree-like structure whereby a parent node is an
action whose branches are other simpler actions, as illustrated in Figure 1. Any of the
ac
EE
EE
EE
EE
yy
yy
yy
yy
ac1 · · · acn
· · · · · · · · ·
Fig. 1. Break-down of action ac into actions aci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
actions aci may be decomposed into other simpler actions; this decomposition is simi-
lar to the modelling of Hierarchical Task Networks in planning systems [Ghallab et al.
2004].
When an obliged action cannot be achieved by any one single agent (under its many
roles) in an organisation enactment, then the action is deemed collective and it should
be “farmed out” to groups of agents so that, by joining their capabilities, the collective
action can be achieved and the obligation fulfilled. On the other hand, an individual
action is within the capabilities of a single agent in an organisation; formally, ac =
〈S, ac, S′〉 is an individual action if, and only if, S′ ⊆ cap(α,Rl ′) for some 〈α,Rl ′〉 ∈
AssocRl .
Collective actions are carried out via sets of individual actions. The effects of individ-
ual actions should thus be combined together to represent the collective actions they
achieve. We capture this via domain axioms: a collective action ac = 〈S, ac, {p′1, . . . , p′r}〉
is achievable via individual actions 〈Si, aci, {q′[1,i], . . . , q′[mi,i]}〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if, and only if,
(
∧n
i=1
∧mi
j=1 q
′
[j,i]) → (
∧r
k=1 pk) is a domain axiom
10. Domain axioms enables agents to
reason about how an action can be decomposed without having to carry out an exten-
sive search for every possible combination of individual actions. Knowledge engineers
supply domain axioms and these will also be used to refine the records of actions in
global states – records of individual actions which were carried out will give rise to
the record of a collective action. We observe that the overall effect of collective actions,
individual actions and domain axioms is similar to “counts-as” rules [Grossi and Jones
2013], relating brute facts (individual actions) with institutional facts (collective ac-
tions).
5.3. Coordination and Group Norms
Agents must coordinate their activities factoring in their roles (with associated ca-
pabilities), their membership to groups, and active norms which are applicable to the
groups. Our reasoning mechanisms (Algorithms 2 and 3) introduced in the next section
9Formula 1 uses a bi-conditional, so if the pre- and post-conditions of two actions are respectively the same,
then the two actions are the same.
10If we regard the action label ac as a shorthand to the post-conditions S′ of action ac = 〈S, ac, S′〉,
then domain axioms can be made more compact. In our case above, we would have the domain axiom
(
∧n
i=1 aci) → ac which could be used by agents when reasoning about how a collective action is to be
broken up and its sub-actions delegated.
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make use of two procedures coordinate and coordinate ′ to support coordination among
agents, which we explain below.
Procedure coordinate is invoked by an agent α who is attempting to coordinate with
agents Agents ′ in order to achieve ϕ, and α is willing to contribute with S′:
coordinate(α,Agents ′, contribute, S′, ϕ)
We do not prescribe any solutions to the coordination mechanism itself, that is, the
messaging/network topology, actual contents of messages and their order, or any guar-
antees such mechanism should have – research on distributed coordination [Williams
2014] and planning [Han et al. 2014] provides candidate solutions for this. The coordi-
nation process will go through a series of rounds whereby agents α′ ∈ Agents ′ receive
requests from α to help with achieving ϕ; the request may also include (partial) in-
formation on α’s contribution S′. Agents will reply to requests offering their own con-
tributions, as part of their deliberation process about what to do next, also factoring
in other group norms – research on how deliberation can be extended with normative
considerations is reported in, for instance, [Meneguzzi et al. 2015]. Agent α will select
who should contribute with what and consider whether it is necessary to send more
requests, in case the responses so far are not sufficient to achieve ϕ. After a finite num-
ber of rounds the coordination process may succeed (and the procedure returns >, that
is, the Boolean value true) or may fail (and the procedure returns ⊥, the Boolean value
false).
The same coordinate procedure supports agents when they are coordinating about
who should refrain from carrying out actions. Such coordination is needed when ac-
tions executed individually by members of a group will cause a violation of a group
prohibition. In such circumstances, individual actions by themselves are not forbid-
den, but their combined effects amount to a forbidden collective action being carried
out – for instance, although individual agents are not forbidden to be in a lift, if more
than, say, 8 of them are in the lift, then a group prohibition is violated. When an agent
is deliberating about which action it should carry out next, then it should factor in
coordination requests to refrain from performing actions which could contribute to a
violation of a group prohibition.
The other procedure coordinate ′ used in our reasoning mechanisms is invoked by an
agent α attempting to coordinate with those agents Agents ′ who belong to the R group
of agents responsible for group norm ADRG ϕ:
coordinate ′(α,Agents ′, ADRG ϕ)
The procedure returns the pair 〈α′, A
′
XR
′
G′ φ〉 with the outcome of the coordina-
tion: α′ ∈ (Agents ′ ∪ {α}) has agreed (as a member of the group responsible for the
norm) to be in charge of A
′
XR
′
G′ φ. The coordination process may convert the origi-
nal norm ADRG ϕ into an altogether different norm
A′XR
′
G′ φ (a special case is when
A′XR
′
G′ φ =
ADRG ϕ, that is, the coordination preserves the original norm). This con-
version would allow, for instance, group norm AO{ag1,ag2}G (p ∧ q) to become norms
AO{ag1}G p and
AO{ag2}G q, that is, the group {ag1, ag2} of agents responsible for the
norm have agreed to take responsibility over parts of the original group norm. Another
important conversion would make use of domain axioms to work out how a group norm
on the effects of a collective action (cf. Section 5.2) could be split into distinct group
norms (with potentially different groups) over the effects of other (collective) actions.
We do not detail the coordinate ′ process here either, but many of the considera-
tions raised for coordinate also apply here. Additionally, the conversion of group norms
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amounts to deontic reasoning added with the manipulation of groups: we do not pro-
vide a solution to this, and we are aware of the computational complexity involved in
solving this in general. Our intention here is to establish when such a process will
be invoked within normative group reasoning, define its information requirements in
terms of input and outputs, and provide an initial list of requirements for solutions
to this process. Although the conversion of group norms in general is computationally
demanding and semi-decidable [Horty 2001; McNamara 2006], the process may target
simpler solutions – in particular, coordinate ′ may simply assign someone in R to be
responsible for the norm, or use a domain axiom to break up a norm on a collective
action onto a norm (or norms) on other actions (collective or individual ones).
6. REASONING ABOUT GROUP NORMS
The objectives of an organisation can only be realised when agents take up the roles
described in the organisation definition. We assume that agents have their own moti-
vations to decide on which roles they will take on, but once a role enactment is fixed,
the agent is able to act on the capabilities described for its role(s). Moreover, agents
have access to the organisation specification consisting of:
— The set of agents Agents enacting/joining the organisation.
— The set of actions Ac (Def. 5.1), the set of roles Rl (Def. 5.2) and their associated
capabilities (Def. 5.3).
— A set AssocRl of pairs 〈α,Rl ′〉, α ∈ Agents,Rl ′ ⊆ Rl , recording which roles Rl ′ indi-
vidual agents α are enacting (hence formally associated with).
— The power relation (Defs. 5.4–5.5) among roles and sets of agents (enacting roles).
The organisation specification allows agents to figure out each other’s (as well as their
own) roles, capabilities, and who has power over whom.
We furthermore assume an open environment in which heterogeneous agents, pos-
sibly developed by third parties, may join the organisation. This means that role en-
actment can take many forms, i.e., depending on the agent’s own “personality”, its in-
terpretation of what is expected from it as enactor of the role (and how to decide about
its role norms) may vary. For instance, an agent with a strong sense of responsibility
will first consider the norms for which it belongs to the Responsible group, whereas an
agent that has a strong sense of duty may start by considering the norms for which
it is an Actor. In the following, we describe, in pseudo-code, reasoning mechanisms for
role enacting agents.
We initially present in Algorithm 1 the general reasoning mechanism, consisting
Algorithm: groupNormReasoning(α, ADRG ϕ)
if α ∈ value(G,Agents) then addressment(α, ADRG ϕ);
if α ∈ value(R,Agents) then responsibility(α, ADRG ϕ);
if α ∈ value(A,Agents) then actorship(α, ADRG ϕ);
Algorithm 1: Group norm reasoning
of an assessment of the value of the norm groups and a check whether or not the
agent belongs to these. Depending on which group the agent belongs to, separate sub-
mechanisms are invoked, and these are explained in the remainder of this section. We
assume that the mechanisms have access to a global set Agents comprising the organ-
isation, as well as the specific actions, roles, capabilities and (group) power relations
(cf. Defs. 5.1–5.5).
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Input parameters α and ADRG ϕ stand for, respectively, the agent’s identity and a
group norm under consideration11. We order the agent’s considerations about group
membership: it first checks if it is part of the group of addressees of the norm, then if it
is part of the group of agents responsible for the norm, and finally the agent checks if it
is an actor of the norm. If none of these situations arise, then the agent does not have
to factor in the group norm in its decision. This ordering is due to the relationships
among agents belonging to the distinct groups: the addressee analysis may require
responsibility and actorship analysis (depending on the circumstances); the responsi-
bility analysis may require actorship analysis, but actorship is self-contained. These
mechanisms are described in the rest of this section.
The mechanism above also caters for situations in which agents simultaneously be-
long to more than one of the groups A,R, or G. As we show below, agents in G that are
addressed by the norm will “farm out” the norm among those responsible (in group R)
and those acting (in group A); those agents responsible for the norm (in group R) will
require the help of acting agents A. When an agent is part of more than one group,
then we will have the phenomenon of agents calling upon themselves to handle the
norm under a different guise.
Our group norm representation is used in mechanisms to support agents reasoning
about actorship (Algorithm 2), responsibility (Algorithm 3), and addressment (Algo-
rithm 4). We illustrate their interdependence as
addressee //
''OO
OOO
OOO
OOO
O responsibility

actorship
The reasoning invokes individual planning (during actorship reasoning), group coordi-
nation (during responsibility reasoning) and individual deliberation (during addressee
reasoning). The reasoning is interleaved with message-passing (protocols) to enable
coordination, as well as communication regarding who is taking up actorship, and to
signal which norm has been violated.
6.1. Reasoning about Actorship
Group norms are ultimately “processed” by actors: these are agents belonging to the
group A of norms ADRG ϕ and their behaviours should be affected by these norms. We
recall that our group norms consider propositional formulae ϕ (cf. Def. 3.3), and we
note that these can come about as a result of a coordinated joint action among various
agents, each contributing some effort to achieve or avoid ϕ. We propose the reasoning
mechanism depicted in Algorithm 2 to enable norm-aware decision-making and coor-
dination among acting agents. Line 1 computes all those sub-groups of actors whose
capabilities (under their respective adopted roles in the organisation) when pooled to-
gether logically derive (or entail) ϕ12. Line 2 computes those coalitions to which α, the
agent executing the algorithm, belongs. Lines 3–11 describe the provisions for norm-
compliant behaviours. Line 12 is a place holder for non-norm-compliant behaviours –
these might include, for instance, having α alerting other team-members (that is, all
11For simplicity, we omit deadlines/periods of norms in our mechanisms, and the assumption is that the
input norm is currently active, that is, its deadline/period has not expired and hence it must be considered.
This assumption can be relaxed, but all algorithms should initially check whether or not the norm is still
active.
12This amounts to finding all minimal coalition of agents who can achieve ϕ collectively [A˚gotnes and
Alechina 2011].
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Algorithm: actorship(α, ADRG ϕ)
1 let A = {Agents ′0, . . . ,Agents ′n}, where each Agents ′i ⊆ value(A,Agents) is the
smallest set s.t. ∀α′ ∈ Agents ′i.〈α′,Rl ′〉 ∈ AssocRl ∧ (
⋃
cap(α′,Rl ′)) ` ϕ
2 Aα ← {Agents ′i ∈ A | α ∈ Agents ′i}
3 if complyNorm(ADRG ϕ,Aα) then
4 MyCap ← cap(α,Rl) where 〈α,Rl〉 ∈ AssocRl
5 for Agents ′ ∈ Aα do
6 if D = O then
7 if coordinate(α, (Agents ′ \ {α}), contribute,MyCap, ϕ) then
8 return >
else
9 if ¬coordinate(α, (Agents ′ \ {α}), refrain,MyCap, ϕ) then
10 return ⊥
11 if D = O then
12 return ⊥
else
13 return >
else
14 ... non-norm-compliant behaviour...
Algorithm 2: Reasoning about actorship
α′ such that α′ 4 α and α 4 α′) or informing its in-line manager (that is, an α′ such
that α 4 α′ and α′ 64 α) about its decision to not comply with a norm. We focus on
norm-compliant behaviour: line 4 computes agent α’s own capabilities MyCap within
the organisation, based on its roles.
Lines 5–13 loop through each minimal coalition to which α belongs, checking
whether the norm is an obligation (line 6) or a prohibition (line 9). In the case of an
obligation, α tries to coordinate with the coalition Agents ′ to contribute with its capa-
bilities MyCap to achieve ϕ – it is enough for one such coordination attempt to succeed
for the actorship algorithm to return > (line 8). In the case of a prohibition (line 9), α
attempts to coordinate with Agents ′ to agree on who is to refrain from doing what in
order to not achieve ϕ (and hence abide by the prohibition) – it is enough for one coor-
dination attempt to fail (that is, ¬coordinate holds in line 9) for the actorship algorithm
to also fail. In both cases, the loop is cut short and a result is returned.
If, however, the loop in lines 5-10 explores all coalitions without returning anything,
then the test in lines 11-13 confirms that agent α was unsuccessful in coordinating to
fulfill the obligation (line 12) or α was successful in coordinating to abide by a prohibi-
tion (line 13), otherwise the commands in line 8 (respectively, line 10) would have been
performed and the flow of execution would never have reached line 12 (respectively,
line 13).
We use logical implications to capture domain axioms, as explained previously, and
we assume completeness of the “`” operator (which appears in line 1 of Alg. 2).
6.2. Reasoning about Responsibility
Agents belonging to group R of a norm ADRG ϕ are responsible for the norm, that is,
they are to blame if the norm is violated. Those agents responsible enlist the help of
acting agents belonging to the group A of our norms. However, agents responsible for
the norm need to agree among themselves who will take the initiative to contact the
actors. Moreover, the agents responsible for the norm should only contact actors over
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whom they have power. This process is represented in Algorithm 3. Line 1 invokes a
Algorithm: responsibility(α, ADRG ϕ)
1 〈inCharge, A
′
XR
′
G′ φ〉 ← coordinate ′(α, (value(R,Agents) \ {α}), ADRG ϕ)
2 if inCharge = α then
3 ActorsSet ← {α′| α′ ∈ value(A′,Agents) ∧ α′ 4 α}
4 for α′ ∈ ActorsSet do
5 if actorship(α′, A
′
XR
′
G′ φ) then
6 return >
7 return ⊥
Algorithm 3: Reasoning about Responsibility
coordination mechanism whereby α interacts with the other members of R regarding
who should be ultimately responsible for the norm. This process should factor in the
nature of ϕ – it might be the case that more than one agent should become involved
in procuring actors to fulfill the norm. We note that the result of this coordination
exercise could be the re-casting of the original norm into distinct norms whose overall
effect, when they are complied with, is the same as the original norm13 and we indicate
this in the algorithm with a (possibly) different norm A
′
XR
′
G′ φ being agreed to (line 2)
by the group R to have α being in charge.
Step 3 computes the set of actors α′ over which α has power (α′ 4 α). Line 4 estab-
lishes a loop over all actors, repeatedly invoking the actorship reasoning mechanism
of algorithm 2, stopping (and returning “>”, that is, success) when the first of the act-
ing agents handles the group norm. Otherwise, when we run out of choices for acting
agents, the mechanism reports a failure “⊥”.
6.3. Reasoning about Addressment
We finally consider the case when an agent is a member of the addressed group G of
norm ADRG ϕ, depicted in Algorithm 4. In this case, the mechanism computes (line 1)
the set of agents α′ responsible for the norm, and over which α has power (α′ 4 α).
Line 2 starts a loop invoking, for each α′, the responsibility mechanism depicted in
algorithm 3, stopping when the first agent handles the norm. Lines 5–9 explores the
exception to the responsibility mechanism, that is, a member α of the addressed group
A, directly takes responsibility over finding actors to deal with the norm – this part of
the mechanism corresponds to lines 3–7 of the responsibility mechanism.
6.4. Discussion
Our representation of group norms caters for three distinct groups involved. Being
able to differentiate among those addressed by the norm (i.e., group G), those respon-
sible for the norm (i.e., group R), and those acting on the norm (i.e., group A), allows
us to formally capture interesting and realistic situations. For instance, a norm such
as “anyone under the age of 16 is obliged to attend school”, can be represented as
AORG attendSchool where
—R is {x : x ∈ People ∧ parent(x, y)∧under16 (y)}, that is, the group responsible for the
norm consists of anyone who is a parent of an under-16 person;
13We illustrate this with a norm (without the groups) OliftTable and axiom (liftEndA ∧ liftEndB) ↔
liftTable, which gives rise to OLiftEndA ∧OLiftEndB .
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Algorithm: addressment(α, ADRG ϕ)
1 ResponsibleSet ← {α′ ∈ value(R,Agents) ∧ α′ 4 α}
2 for α′ ∈ ResponsibleSet do
3 if responsibility(α′, ADRG ϕ) then
4 return >
5 ActorSet ← {α′ ∈ value(A,Agents) ∧ α′ 4 α}
6 for α′ ∈ ActorSet do
7 if actorship(α′, ADRG ϕ) then
8 return >
9 return ⊥
Algorithm 4: Reasoning about Addressment
—G = A and they are |{y : y ∈ People ∧ under16 (y)}| = 1, that is, those addressed and
the actors are individuals (i.e., sets of size one) who are under-16.
The norm “groups of more than 3 children are forbidden to be in a shop” is formalised
as AFRG inShop where
—G is Children, that is, the norm is addressed at all kids;
—R is |{x : x ∈ Children}| = 1, that is, each kid is individually responsible for the norm
(hence the set has exactly one member);
—A is |Children ′| > 3, that is, the actors are all groups of kids with 3 or more members
A third example is the norm “the chairperson of a meeting is obliged to have the sec-
retary circulating the minutes”, formalised as AORG circulateMinutes, where
—G = Meeting , that is, the norm is addressed to all those attending the meeting.
—R = {chair}, that is, the responsible for the norm is the chairperson (singleton set);
—A = {secretary}, that is, the secretary (a singleton set) is the one acting on the norm.
Our group norm representation has been put to use in mechanisms to support agents
reasoning about actorship (Algorithm 2), responsibility (Algorithm 3), and address-
ment (Algorithm 4). Completeness is achieved as the net effect of our mechanism is
that addresee agents exhaustively try to find someone responsible or someone to act
(invoking responsibility and actorship analyses), the responsible agents exhaustively
try to find actors, and finally the actors try to plan, factoring in the constraints of the
norm (avoiding prohibited states, and aiming at obliged states). Termination of the
process is guaranteed if there are no loops in the power relation, as all groups are fi-
nite, and so are the agents’ individual roles and actions, and the interaction (although
not shown) converges with a successful action/plan or a message declining to help. The
complexity of the three combined analyses, in the worst case, is the permutation of the
elements of all three sets, that is, 2|G×R×A| – this is increased by the number of actions
agents have to comply with norms (different actions may have different but overlap-
ping post-conditions and may thus be used interchangeably) and the different ways in
which collective actions can be achieved, as defined by domain axioms.
7. ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO: GROUP NORMS FOR CLOUD COMPUTING
We illustrate our approach via a cloud computing scenario in which software agents
manage Web services to provide support to scientific workflows [Juve and Deelman
2010]. Cloud computing solutions should address three important features, namely,
openness (that is, components come and go and there is no central control or owner-
ship of all components), heterogeneity (that is, components can be implemented using
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disparate technologies) and autonomy (that is, components decide by themselves on
if/when and how they respond or interact with one another).
Ours is a simplified scenario in which we consider three kinds of functionalities,
which should come together to provide a solution for a scientific experiment:
— Data storage – agents manage and provide space for storing (intermediate) data
results for periods of time; depending on the amount of storage required, many ser-
vices may need to be combined and the data are split among storage services.
— Data processing – scientific workflows make use of distinct algorithms (implemented
as Web services) which are combined together.
— Data provision – data collections are provided for experiments.
Software agents are responsible for providing cloud-based solutions, communicating
and coordinating with other agents to deliver functionalities. We endow our agents
with organisation- and norm-awareness, enabling them to agree among themselves on
individual and collective norm-compliant behaviours.
As mentioned in Section 5, without loss of generality, we model in our scenario norms
addressing properties of states, rather than actions.
7.1. Organisation Specification
In our scenario we modelled the following roles:
— Scientific advisor (sa) – sets out the scientific experiment.
— Computing officer (co) – makes technical provisions for the experiment.
— Domain expert (de) – brings the expert’s perspective to the experiment.
— Storage provider (sp) – provides storage.
— Process provider (pp) – provides processing functionalities.
— Data provider (dp) – provides data collections.
These roles are organised along the power structure shown in Figure 2 (where r 4−→ r′
means r 4 r′).
sa
co
4 // de
4
OO
sp
4
OO
dp
4
OO
pp
4
aaCCCCCCCCC
Fig. 2. Power relation among roles in cloud computing scenario
The actions available to our roles are shown in Table III. For simplicity, and because
they are not explored in our scenario, the pre-conditions Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, and the actual
labels of actions aci, 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, are not shown – these, however, are important when
agents need to reason about which actions to choose. We explore group phenomena,
whereby agents coordinate to abide by norms.
We inter-relate the post-conditions of the actions above, capturing their combined
effects (in a similar way as the “count-as” relation [Grossi et al. 2005]). We use logi-
cal implications to capture domain axioms, as explained previously. We model in our
scenario how cloud solutions are assembled together, that is, how data collections, al-
gorithms and data storage provisions should be combined. We show in Table IV our
domain axioms and their intended meaning.
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Table III. Actions available in the Cloud Computing Scenario.
Action Meaning
〈S1, ac1, {s1}〉 Provision of data storage (type 1)
〈S2, ac2, {s2}〉 Provision of data storage (type 2)
〈S3, ac3, {s3}〉 Provision of data storage (type 3)
〈S4, ac4, {g1}〉 Provision of algorithm 1
〈S5, ac5, {g2}〉 Provision of algorithm 2
〈S6, ac6, {d1}〉 Provision of data collection 1
〈S7, ac7, {d2}〉 Provision of data collection 2
〈S8, ac8, {d3}〉 Provision of data collection 3
〈S9, ac9, {sd1}〉 Provision of data collection & storage (solution 1)
〈S10, ac10, {sd2}〉 Provision of data collection & storage (solution 2)
〈S11, ac11, {dg1}〉 Provision of data collection & algorithm (solution 1)
〈S12, ac12, {dg2}〉 Provision of data collection & algorithm (solution 2)
〈S13, ac13, {e1}〉 Provision of experiment 1
〈S14, ac14, {e2}〉 Provision of experiment 2
Table IV. Domain axioms for solutions in the Cloud Computing Scenario.
Domain Axiom Meaning
(s2 ∧ s3 ∧ d3)→ sd1 (DA1) data collection 3 requires storage provisions of type 2 and 3
(s1 ∧ d1 ∧ d2)→ sd2 (DA2) data collections 1 and 2 require storage provisions of type 1
(d3 ∧ g1)→ dg1 (DA3) data collection 3 requires algorithm 1
(d1 ∧ d2 ∧ g2)→ dg2 (DA4) data collections 1 and 2 require algorithm 2
(sd1 ∧ dg1)→ e1 (DA5) experiment e1 is performed when sd1, dg1 hold
(sd2 ∧ dg2)→ e2 (DA6) experiment e2 is performed when sd2, dg2 hold
We note that DA5, when used in conjunction with DA1 and DA3, yields (s2 ∧ s3 ∧
d3 ∧ g1)→ e1. Such effect will be achieved when actions ac2, ac3, ac4 and ac8 have been
performed (this being captured by their post-conditions). Similarly, DA6, in conjunc-
tion with DA2 and DA4, yields (s1∧d1∧d2∧g2)→ e2, that is, experiment e2 is deemed
to have been performed when {s1, d1, d2} (from sd2) and {d1, d2, g2} (from dg2) hold; this
will be the case when actions ac1, ac5, ac6, ac7 are performed.
The role labels and actions above are formally related as the set of roles defining the
organisational model of the cloud computing scenario, namely:
— Scientific advisor: 〈sa, {ac13, ac14}〉
— Computing officer: 〈co, {ac9, ac10}〉
— Domain expert: 〈de, {ac11, ac12}〉
— Storage provider: 〈sp, {ac1, ac2, ac3}〉
— Process provider: 〈pp, {ac4, ac5}〉
— Data provider: 〈dp, {ac6, ac7, ac8}〉
Figure 3 shows a diagram with organisation components and those agents enacting
specific roles. Each node of our diagram is a triple 〈rl,Agents ′, S〉, where rl ∈ Rl is a
role, Agents ′ ⊆ Agents are the agents adopting role rl and S = cap(α, rl), α ∈ Agents ′.
We put our scenario specification to use in the following subsection.
7.2. Group Norm Reasoning for Cloud Computing
Algorithms 1–4 rely on an organisation specification as well as information about spe-
cific agents enacting the organisation. We make use of the organisation specification
introduced in the previous section as well as the following specific agents, and their
associated roles:
— Agents = {ag1, . . . , ag6}, where all agents choose norm-compliant behaviours.
— AssocRl = {〈ag1, {sa}〉, 〈ag2, {co}〉, 〈ag3, {de}〉, 〈ag4, {sp,pp}〉, 〈ag5, {dp}〉, 〈ag6, {pp}〉}
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〈sa, {ag1}, {e1, e2}〉
〈co, {ag2}, {sd1, sd2}〉
4 // 〈de, {ag3}, {dg1, dg2}〉
4
OO
〈sp, {ag4}, {s1, s2, s3}〉
4
OO
〈dp, {ag5}, {d1, d2, d3}〉
4
OO
〈pp, {ag6}, {g1, g2}〉
4
jjUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
Fig. 3. Organisation and agents of cloud computing scenario
Let us consider a group norm AORG e1 where:
— The set of agents responsible for the norm is R = {α : role(α, co)} ∪ {α : role(α,de)},
that is, those agents adopting the roles of computing officer or domain expert.
— The set of addressee agents is G = {α : role(α, sa)}, that is, those adopting the role
of scientific advisor.
— The set of actors is A = {α : role(α, sp)}∪ {α : role(α,pp)}∪ {α : role(α,dp)}, that is,
the agents adopting the roles of storage, process or data providers.
This group norm expresses that ‘the scientific advisors must ensure the provision of
experiment 1, under responsibility of the computing officers and domain experts’. The
actorship relation, left implicit in the norm, follows from the organisational structure
as presented in Figure 2.
For the set definitions above we make use of property role(α, rl) which holds iff
〈α,Rl〉 ∈ AssocRl ∧ rl ∈ Rl . Given the set Agents, we have:
— The agents responsible are value(R,Agents) = {ag2, ag3}
— The set of addressee agents is value(G,Agents) = {ag1}
— The actor agents are value(A,Agents) = {ag4, ag5, ag6}
We explore what happens when agent ag1 (the scientific advisor) invokes Alg. 1 to
reason about the norm. Since ag1 belongs to the set G of addressee agents, Alg. 4 is
invoked. Step 1 of Alg. 4 computes a subset of those agents in R over which ag1 has
power, that is, ResponsibleSet = {ag3} (since ag3 has role de and de 4 sa). Alg. 4 then
invokes (in line 3) Alg. 3 via responsibility(ag3,
AORG e1).
Line 1 of Alg. 3 has ag3 attempting to coordinate with R = {ag2} about who is to
be in charge over which norms. Let us assume that agents ag2 and ag3 work out (via
the domain axioms) that to achieve e1 they ought to achieve (sd1 ∧ dg1), that is, the
returned norm A
′
XR
′
G′ φ (we use X to differentiate the modality of the norm from the
modality of the input parameter norm D) would be AORG (sd1 ∧ dg1); the choice of
which agent to be in charge is dependent on who has power over which other agents.
In this instance, if the agents had agreed on ag2 being in charge, then there would not
have been a way of fulfilling the norm as ag2 would not have power over agents with
the required capabilities. In our scenario, the agents agree that ag3 is to be in charge.
Line 3 of Alg. 3 computes the set of actors over which ag3 has power, that is, {ag4, ag5,
ag6} (where ag4 comes in via ag2 as power is transitive – cf. Def. 5.4). A loop ensues,
whereby the actorship algorithm (Alg. 2) is invoked with each agent in {ag4, ag5, ag6}.
We now follow what happens when the actorship algorithm (Alg. 2) is invoked by ag4.
Line 1 computes all minimal coalitions of agents associated with roles whose capabili-
ties achieve (sd1 ∧dg1). The domain axioms help agents to further explore the different
ways in which post-conditions (that is, the effects) of actions can be achieved – in our
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scenario we have {s2, s3, d3, g1} ` (sd1∧dg1) and the set of coalitions is {{ag4, ag5, ag6}}.
Agent ag4 would compute its own capabilities (line 4) that is, MyCap = {s1, s2, s3},
and would try to coordinate with the other agents of the coalition to agree on how
each could contribute to achieving (sd1 ∧ dg1), that is, coordinate(ag4, {ag4, ag5, ag6},
contribute, {s1, s2, s3}, (sd1 ∧ dg1)).
We show in Figure 4 how the various reasoning steps were carried out in our sce-
nario, also including which agent/role led the reasoning step and who was also in-
volved. The numbers on the arrows indicate the order in which the various agents got
〈sa, {ag1}, {e1, e2}〉
1

〈co, {ag2}, {sd1, sd2}〉 〈de, {ag3}, {dg1, dg2}〉2oo
3ttiiii
iiii
iiii
iiii
i
〈sp, {ag4}, {s1, s2, s3}〉 4 //
4
00〈dp, {ag5}, {d1, d2, d3}〉 〈pp, {ag6}, {g1, g2}〉
Fig. 4. Flow of reasoning in cloud computing scenario
involved in the normative reasoning, also indicating who (that is, the agent who is in
the origin of the arrow) called on for help from whom (the agent who the tip of the
arrow points at). We note that arrow 1 indicates addressment reasoning, lines 2 and
3 indicate responsibility reasoning and lines 4 indicate actorship reasoning. We note
that the agent associated with role de was able to take advantage of the transitivity of
the power relation, roping in an actor agent enacting role sp (via role co, over which
de has power).
Using our same scenario with norms AORG (e2 ∨ sd1) and AFRG s1 (where groups
A,R and G are the same as before), and following a similar reasoning process, we
would see in steps 3 and 4 (cf. the diagram in Fig. 4) an interesting phenomenon. In
step 3 two potential coalitions, namely {ag4, ag5, ag6} (with combined capabilities to
provide for e2) and {ag4, ag5} (with combined capabilities to provide for sd1) would
be computed (line 1 of Alg. 2). However, when acting agents factor in the prohibition
via a coordination process (as explained in Section 5.3), then they will work out that
ag4 should refrain from achieving s1, hence coalition {ag4, ag5, ag6} would not achieve
e2. Coalition {ag4, ag5} would then coordinate to provide for sd1, thus fulfilling the
obligation, and abiding by the prohibition. The coordination process invoked in the
reasoning mechanisms, as explained in Section 5.3, support this activity.
8. RELATED WORK
In addition to the various pieces of research discussed throughout the paper, in this
section we address other related work. Work on collective agency (e.g., [Carmo 2010;
Carmo and Pacheco 2001; Pacheco and Carmo 2003]) and collective obligations (e.g.,
[Grossi et al. 2004]) have addressed similar concerns as ours. These approaches repre-
sent norms over actions, establishing groups of agents to whom the norms apply. Some
approaches regard group norms as a shorthand for a norm which applies to all/some
members of the group (e.g, [Carmo and Pacheco 2001]), whereas other approaches (e.g.,
[Grossi et al. 2004]) regard group norms (more specifically, collective obligations) as a
shared complex action requiring individual contributions (i.e., simpler actions) from
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Group Norms for Multi-Agent Organisations A:27
those individuals of the group. However, these approaches only deal with the element
of shared responsibility, neglecting the element of shared actorship.
Research about the concept of shared actorship can be found in work on joint action
and coalitions (e.g., [Borgo 2007; A˚gotnes and Alechina 2011; Grossi et al. 2007]). This
line of investigation is relevant as it looks into individual deliberation when coordi-
nation is required. Work exploring aspects of delegation (e.g., [Dignum and Dignum
2011; Norman and Reed 2010]) sheds light on how norms can be transferred among
individuals and groups. When agents join organisations they will need to consider
the implications of taking up roles, since these will determine to which groups agents
will ultimately belong, and consequently which norms will be applicable, as well as
how power and delegation will impact on the agents’ choices. Research has addressed
issues of expressiveness and reasoning complexity in various logics of coalition (e.g,
[Broersen et al. 2009; Troquard 2014]), establishing that even for simple propositional
fragments, complexity is very high (i.e., PSPACE in the size of the formula checked).
The notion of group association and imposing norms on groups of agents is closely
related to the concept of roles. Roles have been explored in research on electronic in-
stitutions [Esteva et al. 2001] and organisations [Dignum 2004; Hannoun et al. 2000;
McCallum et al. 2008; Pacheco and Carmo 2003]. Roles describe collections of stereotyp-
ical individuals who, by adopting a role, become subject to any norms associated with
that role. We note that norms addressing roles are a useful shorthand for specialised
norms addressing individuals, that is, they stand for “any one who has adopted role
r is subject to norm ν”. For instance, a norm such as “Soldiers are forbidden to enter
area (x, y)” and given agents a1, . . . , an who have taken up the soldier role, stands for
“Agent ai is forbidden to enter area (x, y)”, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Importantly, in existing
research role norms typically do not influence the joint behaviour of individuals and
do not require coordination.
In philosophy of mind, a recurrent way of looking at groups of agents is “group
agency”, whereby the group of agents is considered as an agent itself. [List and Pettit
2011] theorize, however, that true group agency cannot exist because of the individual-
ity of the members of the group; in order to achieve the required commonality to see a
group as an agent, the group needs a level of collective rationality, anonymity and sys-
tematicity that cannot be achieved (under reasonable assumptions). A group cannot be
simply reduced to its members (there is more than just a “mere collection”) because of
coordination activities required to make the group function properly. In this paper we
explored exactly those aspects of groups that make them more than “mere collection”
of agents, by trying to formalise the rationality required to function as a group.
A similar vision of groups is taken by the field of commitment-based norms [Singh
et al. 2009; Noriega et al. 2013; Baldoni et al. 2014; Chopra et al. 2014]. In the formal-
isation of norms with commitments, the authors often use individuals and companies
interchangeably, for instance to express that an insurance company is committed to
cover the expenses of the claim of a customer. It appears that these formalisations use
groups as a complex entity that can be held accountable (as a group) for the actions
(of the group). None of the papers, however, go into the detail as to how the action or
responsibility is propagated to the individual members of the group, as is done here.
An interesting field of related research is on organizational-aware agency [van
Riemsdijk et al. 2009; Jensen et al. 2014]. The research develops frameworks to build
agents that are aware of organizational restrictions and norms to allow them to reason
about how to be compliant with an organizational specification. Since they work with
existing organization specification languages, e.g., OperA [Dignum 2004] or MOISE
[Hannoun et al. 2000], and these specification languages use role norms as individ-
ual norms (agents playing that role are each addressed individually, are assumed to
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act individually and are held responsible individually). More interesting are the co-
ordination restrictions put on the agents by other components of the organization –
our contributions to reasoning about addressment, responsibility or actorship in group
norms enrich organization-aware agency frameworks.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a representation for group norms, a topic largely ignored in the
literature. Our proposal caters for three distinct types of stakeholders, namely, the ad-
dressees of the norm, those responsible for the norm, and those whose behaviours are
impacted by the norm (the actors). We used a simple set-based formalism to precisely
define groups and explored our notion of group norms within a minimalist organisation
model. Using common organisational concepts such as roles, capabilities and power, we
proposed three inter-connected simple reasoning mechanisms for autonomous agents
to operate within organisations factoring group norms when deciding who is to do (or
not do) what, with whom, and when.
Our representation has been influenced by a taxonomy of cases for group norms
[Aldewereld et al. 2013], with two dimensions – the individual and the collective –
within a group. Certain norms, although addressed to groups, are fulfilled/violated
by a single (or some) members; other norms are aimed at the group as a whole.
Our reasoning mechanisms are a first attempt at defining how agents can factor in
group/individual issues when deciding what to do within an organisation (hence there
is a degree of predictability on the agents’ part), presenting clear connections with gen-
erally agreed organisational concepts. Very importantly, our approach can be adapted
and applied to other circumstances where group norms are needed, for instance, by
dropping one or more of the groups in the formalism, with appropriate simplifications
in the reasoning mechanisms. The reasoning mechanisms can be applied to other situ-
ations where group norms are used, but our formalisation makes it possible to reason
with and about the various groups (addressees, actors, and those responsible for the
norm) also allowing agents to differentiate between these.
In this paper, we have abstracted from what the action or state referred to by the
norm entails. Depending on the interpretation (cf. [Aldewereld et al. 2013]) the action
may be individual, i.e., each agent in the Actorship group should act on it, or collective,
in which case all, or a subset, of the agent in the Actorship group should jointly act on
it. In future work, we will further detail the reasoning about group norms such that
planning for the norm can incorporate both reasoning about individual plans and joint
plans.
Our representation of norms may give rise to conflicts, whereby actions (or states of
affairs) are simultaneously obliged and prohibited (or permitted and prohibited) [Vas-
concelos et al. 2009]. We note that in our norm representation, for two norms AORG ϕ
and A
′
FR
′
G′ φ to be in conflict, the following should hold (where Φ is the background
theory): i) Φ ∧ ϕ ∧ φ ` ⊥, that is, the norms’ actions or states of affairs, com-
bined with the background theory, derive an inconsistency ⊥; ii) (value(A,Agents) ∩
value(A′,Agents)) 6= ∅, that is, the sets of actors of both norms must have an over-
lap. In future work we shall explore alternative mechanisms to manipulate the group
descriptions, so as to remove any overlap. Moreover, we will explore means whereby
groups R and G might agree among themselves who will handle specific norms, thus
partitioning the space of possible coalitions for acting agents, and thus avoiding con-
flicts altogether.
We assumed our agents “do as they are told” when asked by an agent who has power
to do so, power being represented as a relation among roles of an organisation. Our
research will relax this assumption, addressing situations in which agents may fail
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to carry out individual actions required for a group obligation, or when agents do not
refrain from performing individual actions which together violate a group prohibition.
In such situations, sanctions should be apportioned, that is, divided among those in
the various group, following different rationales [Dubnick and Frederickson 2014]. If
we consider just the group of actors, some cases are clear: if none of the members of a
group carried out their individual actions in order to comply with a group obligation,
then they should all be equally sanctioned. Other cases are not as obvious: given a
group prohibition on a collective action, it is not clear if only the last agent to carry out
an individual action, which together with other individual actions of other members
of the group violated a prohibition, should be sanctioned, or if the whole group should
be sanctioned. Sanctions should be apportioned to those agents addressed by a norm if
they failed to procure agents responsible for the norm, and similarly, agents responsi-
ble for a norm should have sanctions apportioned to their group if they fail to procure
actors.
We are currently extending our mechanisms with communication, using classic, off-
the-shelf protocols such as the Contract Net Protocol (CNP14) when those agents re-
sponsible for a norm call on the help of actors (e.g, choosing which agent α to invoke
actorship with, in Algorithm 4), and voting protocols/mechanisms [Battaglini et al.
2005] when those agents responsible decide among themselves who should pursue the
norm (the coordinate step in Algorithm 3). We will connect our approach with existing
planning techniques (e.g., HTN [Nau et al. 2003]) to evaluate how our group norms can
help agents agree on joint plans with fewer messages and in fewer rounds.
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